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Abstract
This paper examines interest-parity conditions that arguably held as regards the investment demand for bills of
exchange during the classical gold standard (1880–1914). Contemporaneous guides to the foreign exchanges report
that close connections between the exchange and discount rates arose mainly with bills traded in London and the
major financial centres on the European continent. As implied by the interest-parity condition, and in particular when
future exchange-rate movements were covered by a suitable long-bill transaction, weekly data do suggest that
between Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, and London, the return from discounting bills of exchange in the local
money market was roughly equivalent to the return from investing in foreign currency bills.
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JEL classification: F31, N13, N23
Introduction
“The Foreign Exchanges [...] are the barometer of the
Money Market. Between the price of London bills, as
expressed in the current rate of discount, and the price
of foreign bills, as expressed in the current exchange
rate, there exists at times a close sympathy [...].” Clare
(1902, p. 87)
The introductory quote is not remarkable for empha-
sising the close connection between the foreign exchange
and money markets, which features prominently in the
interest-parity condition, but for having been taken from
a guide first published back in 1891 to provide “A Money-
Market Primer and Key to the Exchanges”. The author,
George Clare, wrote this book for the practitioner in
the banking industry. Although Clare never reached aca-
demic fame, his work was praised by none other than
Alfred Marshall as “the only tolerably good small book
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dealing with Banking and The Exchanges” (Groenewegen
1985). Apparently, before the year 1900, bankers had
already developed a solid understanding of the connec-
tions between the exchange and interest rate (or at the
time the discount rate). Indeed, according to Einzig (1962,
pp. 184–185), during the nineteenth century, “the estab-
lishment of closer relations between banks [...] led to a
considerable increase in the volume of exchange arbi-
trage [...] and also the volume of interest arbitrage” and
the corresponding techniques were “described in detail in
innumerable practical books and articles”. Specifically, it
was arguably mainly in the economically and financially
most advanced European nation states such as Britain,
France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where
banks had the option of reinvesting idle deposits in the
local money market, or earning short-term interest by
purchasing bills of exchange involving foreign currencies.
Reflecting the importance of this so-called investment
demand for bills of exchange, numerous contemporane-
ous books can be found discussing interest-parity trans-
actions involving European bills of exchange (Clare 1895,
ch. 14–16, 1902, ch. 9; Spalding 1915, ch. 7; Thomas 1921,
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ch. 8). In his famous portrait of the London money mar-
ket in Lombard Street, even Bagehot (1873, pp. 45–46)
touches briefly on this issue.
By way of contrast, around 1900, academic research
about the foreign exchanges was still in its infancy. Early
fragments of the interest-parity condition can already be
found in Thornton (1802, ch. 5), whereas Goschen (1861)
and Lotz (1889) published more extensive, but still highly
informal, discussions. It was only during the first part of
the twentieth century when formal theories that exchange
ratemovements offset, on average, the differences in inter-
est rates between currencies began to establish themselves
in the academic literature (Einzig 1962, ch. 17 and 21). In
particular, Fisher (1896, ch. 9) and Keynes (1923, ch. 3.4)
are often quoted as path-breaking contributions relating
to, respectively, the uncovered and covered interest-parity
condition.
Compared with the voluminous empirical literature
testing the interest-parity condition with modern data,
for the major European financial centres during the era
of the classical gold standard, the corresponding ques-
tion has hitherto received much less attention. Although a
small empirical literature including Goodhart (1969) and
Coleman (2012) has tested the uncovered interest-parity
condition around the year 1900, these contributions have
looked at the dollar-to-sterling exchange rate and, owing
to the slow dissemination of information and substan-
tial transaction costs, found only scant support for the
interest-parity condition. However, at the end of the nine-
teenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, interest
arbitrage arose arguably primarily as regards the invest-
ment demand for bills of exchange issued in London and
in the main financial centres across the English Channel.
Corroborating this, the contemporaneous guides empha-
sise that, rather than with New York, close links existed
between the discount rate in the open money markets of
Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Brussels and the demand
for London bills of exchange (Clare 1902, pp. 129ff.). As
regards the covered interest-parity condition, Flandreau
and Komlos (2006) provide an empirical study about early
arbitrage transactions between Berlin and Vienna, where
a forward foreign exchange market had already devel-
oped during the second half of the nineteenth century.
Conversely, for the major currencies around the world,
regular forward exchange transactions did not occur until
after the First World War (Einzig 1962, pp. 182–183,
1967, pp. 7–8). Finally, rather than testing interest-parity
relationships, they have also been employed to extract
implied, or shadow, interest rates from international bills
of exchange transactions. This approach, which takes the
interest-parity condition for granted, has mainly been
used for the pre-modern era, for which interest rate data
are often unavailable and, when they were reported, were
often subject to the constrains from usury laws (see e.g.
Flandreau et al., 2009). However, Obstfeld and Taylor
(2004, pp. 87ff.), for the case of London, New York and
Berlin, and Flandreau and Rivière (1999), for the case of
London and Paris, present corresponding results for the
late nineteenth century.
Against this background, this paper endeavours to con-
tribute to the literature by testing how closely the discount
and exchange rates were connected between the leading
European financial centres during the era of the classi-
cal gold standard (1880—1914). In so doing, the fact that
bills of exchange were the dominant security for short-
term investments and managing exchange-rate risk will
be taken into account. Based on weekly data, the results
suggest that the bills of exchange versions of the interest-
parity condition held remarkably well between European
currencies, which were known for their long-standing sta-
bility as regards the convertibility into gold. Specifically,
when comparing the continental discount rate with the
exchange-rate adjusted return in London, the postulated
proportional relationship tends to arise. Furthermore,
even for investments by a London-based bank on the
continent, where the lack of suitable long-bills made it dif-
ficult to hedge against future exchange-rate movements,
the interest-parity condition holds reasonably well.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section
explains the historical role of bills of exchange for deter-
mining the relevant market exchange and discount rates
during the gold standard. The “Weekly discount and
exchange rate data” section discusses the data. The
“Methods” section explains the peculiarities of interest-
parity conditions involving bills of exchange. The “Results
and discussion” section introduces the econometric strat-
egy and presents the results. The “Conclusion” section
summarises and concludes.
Background
Exchange rates during the gold standard
From around 1880 until the outbreak of the First World
War in 1914, the gold standard served as role model
for the international currency system. During this era
of the classical gold standard, the definition of the
currency value in terms of gold—the so-called mint-
par—gave rise to officially fixed exchange rates. Nev-
ertheless, the rates on the foreign exchange markets
did move to some degree. One reason was that inter-
national gold shipments, which enforced the mint-par,
were costly, wherefore the market exchange rate could
fluctuate within a band of gold-arbitrage inactivity (see
e.g. Clare 1895, ch. 7). An ongoing debate is still try-
ing to determine the width of this band, which was
delimited by the so-called gold-points. There are sev-
eral reasons why this has turned out to be challenging
including the numerous, time-varying cost components
to transport gold across countries (Clare 1902, pp. 78–79;
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Canjels et al. 2004, p. 869), or the complications aris-
ing when triangular gold arbitrage is possible (Coleman
2007).1 To nevertheless provide some rough values,
for the French and the Belgian franc, contemporane-
ous sources set the upper and lower gold-points at,
respectively, 25.12 Fcs/£ and 25.32 Fcs/£ (Clare 1895,
p. 126; Tate 1908, p. 51), for the Dutch guilder at 12.05
Fl/£ and 12.15 Fl/£ (Tate, 1908, p. 328), and for the
German mark at 20.32 M/£ and 20.53 M./£ (Clare 1895,
p. 131) reflecting deviations of between 0.2 and 0.7 per
cent from the mint-pars of, respectively, 25.22 Fcs/£, 12.07
Fl/£, and 20.43 M/£. Furthermore, even in its heyday, the
gold standard was not a homogeneous system. In Europe,
Britain and Germany came closest to the theoretical ideal
of a freely convertible monometallic currency backed
by gold, followed by Belgium, France, the Netherlands,
and Switzerland, where the conversion of the local cur-
rency into gold was subject to some restrictions (see
Eichengreen 2008, pp. 20ff.). Still, for decades, these rel-
atively wealthy and financially advanced European nation
states managed to anchor the exchange rate to the mint-
par, which arguably implied that the remaining, small fluc-
tuations on the foreign exchange market were primarily a
reaction to international differences in interest (discount)
rates (Clare 1902, p. 94). Conversely, the currency systems
of other European countries were at most incompletely
associated with the gold standard. For example, aside from
a short period in the 1880s, the Italian mint-par of 25.22
lire/£ was never officially instituted (Eichengreen 2008,
p. 17). In Spain, Portugal, or Russia, substantial parts
of the currency consisted of inconvertible paper money
(Clare 1895, pp. 157–160). Austria-Hungary had essen-
tially a freely floating currency until the end of the 1880s,
and undertook several monetary reforms during the
1890s to gradually stabilise the exchange rate against gold
around the year 1900 (see Von Mises 1909; Flandreau and
Komlos 2006). The exchange rates of all these coun-
tries were relatively instable (Einzig 1962, 198–199) and
reacted to fluctuations in international trade, or changes
in foreign indebtedness (Clare 1902, p. 94).
Bills of exchange are the key financial instrument
Amid an era of widespread economic and political stabil-
ity, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed an
unprecedented expansion of cross-border trade and cap-
ital flows (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004). However, owing to
the costs as well as the inelastic supply of gold-backed
money, the massive increase in international payments
was not matched by a corresponding increase of cross-
border transfers of gold bullion or coins. Hence, interna-
tional capital flows exceeded by far the volume of trade,
which was, in turn, far larger than cross-border transfers
of gold (Eichengreen 2008, pp. 24ff.). These discrepancies
reflect that, since the Middle Ages, bills of exchange were
widely used to finance international payments (see, e.g.
Denzel 2010, ch. 3, Einzig 1962, ch. 7). In essence, a bill
of exchange was a written order by an issuer, called the
drawer, instructing a counterparty2, called the drawee, to
pay a certain amount of money at a specific place either
immediately (sight-bill) or at the end of a given—usually
3 months—term to maturity (long-bill).
Bills could be issued requiring payment in a foreign
country or city with a different currency. Since they dom-
inated international payments during the nineteenth cen-
tury, bills of exchange determined the relevant foreign
currency price for cross-border business (see, e.g. Denzel
2010, ch. 3.3). As such, the market exchange rates quoted
for foreign bills could deviate from the mint-par. More
specifically, when the demand for bills on a foreign cur-
rency was relatively high and/or the supply relatively low,
the market exchange rate of that currency appreciated.
What will be important for interest parity considerations
is that fluctuations of the market exchange rate occurred
with sight as well as with long-bills.
By combining elements of credit with money trans-
fers, bills of exchange became the preferred instrument to
arrange cashless payments. Though originally designed to
finance trade (trade-bill), around 1900, bills of exchange
served also as instrument for purely financial purposes
such as making short-term foreign investments (finance-
bill) (Goschen 1861, ch. 3; Escher 1913, ch. 2; Clare 1895,
ch. 13). In particular, banks on the European continent
used to reinvest substantial parts of the savings deposited
with them by purchasing bills issued in London rather
than in their local money market. This practice became
known as “the continental investment demand for London
bills” (see Clare 1902, ch. 9; Spalding 1915, ch. 7; Thomas
1921, ch. 8). Conversely, before the First World War,
British banks tended to ignore foreign currency bills
(Clare 1895, p. 89, 1902, p. 95; Thomas 1921, p. 78).
Especially when bills of exchange were drawn on a bank
with a good reputation, they were seen as safe asset,
or “first-class” bank-paper. This provided the basis for
turning a bill into a transferable financial instrument,
which could be sold well before its due date to a third
party, often a discount house, which purchased a bill
at a discount in anticipation of receiving the final pay-
ment (see Cassis 2010, p. 84). From the perspective of
the drawer, the selling (or discounting) of bills had the
advantage of receiving early payment, but came at the
price of the so-called discount rate, that is the interest
charged by the third party. The development of dis-
count markets and specialised discount houses meant
that bills of exchange became tradable and, hence, an
“admirably liquid security” (Spalding 1915, p. 80). Due
to the pivotal role of bills of exchange, the discount rate
used to be the most closely watched interest rate of the
financial system.
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London serves as global discount market
Reflecting the role of Britain as leading industrial nation,
during the four decades preceding the First World War,
London had established itself as principal hub for arrang-
ing, funding, and insuring the bulk of international trade
and payments (Cassis 2010, pp. 83ff.). Though other finan-
cial centres—in particular, Paris and Berlin in Europe
and New York in America—also witnessed rapid devel-
opments, the dominance of London was such that, prior
to 1914, around half of global trade was financed by bills
denominated in sterling, which had obtained the status of
international currency par excellence (Atkin 2005, p. 5).
With bills of exchange accounting for most international
payments, this implied that a group of British merchant
banks and discount houses accepted and discounted vast
amounts of sterling-bills (generally of three months matu-
rity) sustaining themost liquidmoneymarket in the world
(see e.g. Fletcher 1976, ch. 2). Banks of the European con-
tinent, through their London branches or agents, took
part in this market (Thomas 1921, pp. 80ff.), and thanks
to the relatively unhindered flow of capital and the tech-
nological progress in telecommunication (telegraph, tele-
phone), financial centres became closer intertwined and
a genuine international capital market began to emerge
(Cassis 2010, p. 131).
Against this background, the interest and exchange rates
set in London served as an international landmark. The
corresponding data were published, typically on a weekly
basis, in the financial press in Britain and abroad. Figure 1
provides examples taken from the 3 March 1888 edition of
The Economist. The top panel shows the London Course
of Exchange bulletin, which reports the exchange rates
on various foreign cities for the two most recent trading
days (here 28 February and 1 March 1888) at the Royal
Exchange, which was the main market for foreign cur-
rency bills in Britain (see Clare 1895, ch. 8). For each for-
eign city, two quotations are given. The first (better)
rate refers to “first-class paper”, which generally meant
bills of exchange involving banks with a good reputa-
tion, whereas the second (higher) rate applied to ordi-
nary trade bills involving little-known firms (see, e.g.
Clare 1895, p. 41; Spalding 1915, pp. 50–51). When
contemplating the actual exchange rate data in the
“Weekly discount and exchange rate data” section, it
will be important to remember that banks preferred
first-class bills (Thomas 1921, ch. 8; Clare 1895, p.
90; 1902, p. 98f.). Of note, most exchange rates in
London refer to 3-month bills; sight or cheque rates were
often only quoted on Paris and sometimes Amsterdam
(Clare 1902, pp. 82, 85). Conversely, according to the
middle panel, sight exchange rates quoted abroad for
bills payable in London existed for several European
financial centres including Paris, Amsterdam, as well as
Berlin (and sometimes Brussels and Vienna). Finally, the
Fig. 1 Exchange and interest rates on 1 March 1888
London and continental open money market discount
rates were also published in The Economist (see bottom
panel of Fig. 1).
Weekly discount and exchange rate data
From tables such as those of Fig. 1, for the decades before
the First World War, Neal and Weidenmier (2003) have
collected weekly time series of discount and exchange
rates across a range of financial centres. Recall that,
whereas most London exchange rates referred to long-
bills, many financial markets on the European continent
quoted only sight rates on London. More specifically, for
the 1880 to 1914 period (the common sample ends in
December 1913), the data include money market discount
rates for French francs in Paris, for Belgian francs in
Brussels, for Dutch guilders in Amsterdam, and for Ger-
man marks in Berlin (denoted here by i∗t ) as well as for
sterling in London (denoted here by it). Furthermore,
there are exchange rates derived from sight-bills issued in
a continental financial centre (and currency) and payable
in sterling in London within a week (S∗t ). For example, for
Paris and London, this exchange rate was briefly referred
to as the “sight-rate in Paris on London”. Furthermore,
there are exchange rates derived from long-bills issued in
London and payable in a specific continental city (and cur-
rency) in 3-month time (Lt). For example, for London and
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Paris, this exchange rate was briefly referred to as “long-
rate in London on Paris”. Detailed definitions and sources
of the data can be found in Table 1.
Contemplating first the case of Paris, which was the
most important financial centre after London (Cassis
2010, pp. 101ff.), the top left panel of Fig. 2 depicts the
exchange rates derived from sight-bills in Paris on London
as well as from long-bills in London on Paris. Since banks
invested preferably in first-class paper, these rates refer to
the lower value reported in Fig. 1. As mentioned above,
the sight (or cheque) rates fluctuated around the mint-
par of 25.22 Fcs./£. Furthermore, since the long-rate of
exchange is always above the sight-rate, a buyer of a long-
bill in London could be almost certain to earn an implicit
return in terms of receiving more French francs than he
would have to lay out for a sight-bill. The top right panel
of Fig. 2 depicts the interest rates derived from discount-
ing bills in the open money markets of London or Paris.
Although these rates follow each other quite closely, the
London rate was more volatile.
Aside from France, also Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Germany were reportedly important participants in the
investment demand for London bills of exchange (see, e.g.
Clare 1895, p. 90). Being based on a very similar inter-
national currency system than France, the Belgian franc
also fluctuated around a mint-par of 25.22 Fcs/£ (see, e.g.
Clare 1895, p. 130; Tate 1908, p. 51). However, as shown
by the second panel of Fig. 2, before 1902, the sight-rate
in Brussels on London was only sporadically reported in
The Economist. Furthermore, the long-rate in London
refers to Antwerp. Between 1880 and 1914, weekly time
series with exchange rates and the discount rate are avail-
able for the Dutch guilder, whose mint-par stood at 12.07
Fl/£ throughout those years. Although well past its golden
age (see Cassis 2010, p. 125), the Netherlands accounted
still for a considerable investment demand for London
bills (Clare 1902, p. 94). Accordingly, the corresponding
panel of Fig. 2 shows the familiar behaviour of the dis-
count and the guilder-to-sterling exchange rates. Finally,
during the 1890s, Berlin became an increasingly impor-
tant financial centre (Cassis 2010, pp. 108ff.; Flandreau
and Jobst 2005, p. 989). The bottom panel reports the
data for the German mark, whose mint-par stood at
20.43 M/£.
For the other financial centres around the world,
exchange rates on sight and long-bills with respect to
London were only published in a highly incomplete man-
ner. This does not necessarily mean that these rates did
not exist. Rather, the non-disclosure suggested, arguably,
that for some countries certain foreign exchange trans-
actions were “out of the ordinary course” and, hence,
there was “no recognised quotation” (Clare 1902, p. 82).
This seems to underscore that interest-parity transactions
involving an investment demand for foreign currency bills
occurred predominantly between sterling and a small
number of European currencies that were at the heart of
the gold standard.3
Methods
Consider the standard uncovered interest-parity condi-
tion (1 + it) = (1 + i∗t )
(
St/E
[
S∗t+m
])
. Recall that it
denotes, here, the return in the London money market at
the 3-month discount rate, i∗t the corresponding return
in the continental money market, whereas St denotes the
sight-rate in London, and E
[
S∗t+m
]
the expected sight-rate
on London upon maturity at date t + m. To eliminate
uncertainties as regards the expected currency gain/loss
of St/E
[
S∗t+m
]
, the covered version of interest parity relies
Table 1 Description of the data set
Variable Unit Description
S∗t Continental
currency per £
(in logarithms)
Exchange rate in terms of the price of a sight-bill payable in sterling as traded in continen-
tal currency. In brief, these bills were called “sight-bills on London” and the corresponding
exchange rate was called the “sight rate in a given continental city on London”. The data
are available for sight-rates in Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, and Brussels. For the case of Paris
and Brussels, the cheque rate has been used for S∗t . For the case of Brussels, the data are
only partly available before 1902.
Lt Continental
currency per £
(in logarithms)
Exchange rate inherent in a long-bill of exchange payable in continental currency as
traded in sterling. The term to maturity is three months. In brief, these bills were called
“long-bills in London” and the corresponding exchange rate was called the “long-rate in
London on a given continental city”. For the case of Belgium, the long-rate was reported
on Antwerp instead of Brussels.
it Per cent
(annualised)
Interest on a short-term investment in the Londonmoney market. The interest arises from
discounting a sterling bill of exchange in the open money market.
i∗t Per cent
(annualised)
Interest on a short-term investment in the continental money market. The interest arises
from discounting a bill of exchange denominated in local currency in the local open
money market.
Variables refer to transactions between London and four continental financial centres (Paris, Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels) between 1880 and 1914. The data have a weekly
frequency
Source of the data: Neal-Weidenmier Gold Standard Database, Neal and Weidenmier (2003)
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Fig. 2 Discount and exchange rates
on financial markets, on which currencies can be traded
for future delivery against payment on delivery at a pre-
arranged exchange rate. However, for most currencies,
such forward markets did not develop until after the First
World War (Einzig 1962, pp. 182–183, 1967, pp. 7–8)4.
Instead, early strategies to exploit international differ-
ences in interest rates relied heavily on long-bill invest-
ments (see, e.g. Clare 1895, ch. 14–16; Spalding 1915,
pp. 80ff.; Thomas 1921, pp. 78ff., Einzig 1967, p. 6).
Although they give rise to an implicit forward exchange
rate, it is important to recognise that long-bills differ from
a modern forward contract in terms of also encapsulating
a short-term credit by requiring an immediate payment
from the buyer, who is promised to receive a certain
amount of foreign currency back uponmaturity (see Clare
1895, ch. 12). Hence, interest-parity conditions involving
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long-bills differ from their modern counterparts (see Juhl
et al. 2006).
Contemplating the cases for which data are available,
consider first the continental investment demand for bills
of exchange, where a bank based, e.g. in Paris, Amsterdam,
Berlin, or Brussels buys a bill on London at the sight-rate
S∗t and, to hedge against exchange-rate risk, combines this
with an immediate investment in a long-bill in London
at the long-rate Lt . To eliminate arbitrage opportunities,
the spread Lt/S∗t between these rates should be equal to
the return of 1 + i∗t in the local discount market. Jointly,
this yields the interest-parity condition reflecting the con-
tinental investment demand for bills of exchange, that is
Lt
S∗t
= (1 + i∗t
)
. (1)
Investments in the prevalent bills could also have been
combined in a different way. For example, a London bank
could first buy a long-bill on a continental city. Upon
maturity, the amount of foreign currency payable had to
be invested in a sight-bill issued on London at the expected
sight-rate E
[
S∗t+m
]
. For an interest parity to emerge, the
resulting return had to coincide with the return of 1 + it
in the London discount market. Taken together, this yields
what might be called the interest-parity condition reflect-
ing the London investment demand for bills of exchange,
that is
Lt
E
[
S∗t+m
] = (1 + it). (2)
Note that, in contrast to (1), (2) is subject to exchange-
rate risk as the realised return of the long-bill investment
depends on the, a priori unknown, rate of a sight-bill
at future date t + m. In any case, (1) and (2) concur
nicely with the historical observation that the price of a
long-bill was “based upon the sight-rate, rising and falling
in agreement with it [...]” (Clare 1902, p. 83) as well as
that investors in long-bills had to be compensated by an
implicit interest rate for awaiting payment (Goschen 1861,
pp. 52ff.; Clare 1895, ch. 12; Spalding 1915, ch. 6).
Results and discussion
This section estimates and tests the just mentioned
interest-parity conditions by means of econometric meth-
ods that were unavailable around 1900. In particular, fol-
lowing the modern literature and applying a logarithmic
transformation (with the corresponding sight and long-
bill rates being denoted by lowercase letters), the regres-
sion equation approximating the continental investment
demand for bills of exchange of (1) is given by
lt − s∗t = α + β
(
i∗t
) + t . (3)
Here, α is an intercept, β is a slope-coefficient reflect-
ing how far exchange and interest rates move in tandem,
and t is a statistical error term. A scenario where there
are no interest-arbitrage opportunities left in the for-
eign exchange and money markets implies that β = 1.
Whereas the estimation of α and β in (3) is relatively
straightforward, some econometric issues arise regard-
ing the corresponding standard deviations. In particular,
a dataset combining 3-month long-bills with observa-
tions that have a weekly frequency gives rise to overlaps
within the sample, which introducemoving-average terms
to the residuals. To account for these when estimating
coefficient standard deviations, Chinn (2006, pp. 9f.) uses
a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) robust
variance-covariancematrix towards a fixed length of serial
correlation of up to twice the overlap (here ± 3 months or
90 days/7 days per week ≈ 13 weeks)5.
For the financial centres for which data are available,
columns (1) to (4) of Table 2 summarise the results of
the continental investment demand for London bills of
exchange6. In particular, column (1) reports the OLS
estimates of Eq. (3) for the Paris financial market. The
coefficient estimate of 1.01 for the slope (β̂), which does
not differ from a value of one at any conventionally used
level of rejection, concurs almost perfectly with the prior
of the interest-parity condition. This finding lends sup-
port to the abovementioned view that, around 1900, a
highly active short-term investment demand for London
bills of exchange aligned the discount and exchange rates
between sterling and other core countries applying the
gold standard. For the case of the Amsterdam financial
market, the results in column (2) also lend empirical sup-
port to the interest-parity condition involving long-bills,
in the sense of giving rise to an estimated slope coefficient
β̂ that does not differ from one at conventional levels of
statistical significance. Column (3) reports the results for
Berlin. With a value of 0.96, β̂ is very close but, at the
5% level of statistical significance, different from one. Per-
haps, this small discrepancy reflects that Berlin only began
to emerge as important foreign exchange centre during
the 1890s (compare “Weekly discount and exchange rate
data” section)7. Similarly, for the investment demand for
London bills of exchange from Brussels, the slope coeffi-
cient of 1.05 is close, but statistically different, from the
hypothesised value. Recall from Fig. 2 that before 1902
sight-rates of the Belgian franc are often missing, where-
fore only around 900 weekly observations are available8.
Transaction costs can drive a wedge into interest parity
conditions (see, e.g. Engel 2014, p. 455). For the current
example looking at the investment demand for bills of
exchange, an ad-valorem stamp duty of 12 per mille was
typically levied on long-bills issued in London (see, e.g.
Clare 1895, ch. 12). Depending on the country, the type of
bill, or the value of a transaction, sight-bills were typically
subject to smaller, or were even exempted from, stamp
duties (see, e.g. Tate 1908). However, transaction costs
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Table 2 Results: Interest parity via long-bills of exchange
Continental investment demand for London
bills of exchange
London investment demand for continental
bills of exchange
Paris Amsterdam Berlin Brussels London on
on London Paris Amsterdam Berlin Brussels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept (̂α) 0.003 0.01 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
i∗t
(
β̂
)
1.01 0.97 0.96 1.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
it
(
β̂
)
0.62 0.75 0.81 0.75
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Reject (β = 1 ) ** *** *** *** *** ***
R2 0.81 0.84 0.87 0.90 0.30 0.33 0.39 0.37
N 1772 1759 1771 903 1759 1749 1759 890
Notes: This table reports estimates of Eq. (3) with dependent variable lt − s∗t and (4) with dependent variable lt − s∗t+m (expressed as annualised value). Estimation is by OLS
with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust (Newey-West) standard errors with a fixed bandwidth of 13 leads and lags. The null hypothesis that the interest parity (via
long-bill transactions) holds implies that β = 1
N the number of observations
Significant deviations from this are indicated by ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level
of similar magnitude than the stamp duty could arguably
arise from brokerage fees and insurance coverage (see
Thomas 1921, pp. 194–195). Although the transaction
costs differed between European countries (Thomas 1921,
p. 24), they were typically smaller than those reported
in Coleman (2012) for the New York financial market.
Still, stamp duties and fees could be responsible for at
least a part of the small deviations from the interest-parity
condition found in columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.
To uncover whether the interest-parity condition held
for the London investment demand for long-bills of
exchange, the standard assumption that expectations cor-
respond with future exchange rates, or E
[
s∗t+m
] = s∗t+m, is
introduced (see Coleman 2012, p. 27). Thematurity equals
3 months, or m = 13 weeks. Hence, transforming (2)
using logarithms yields
lt − s∗t+m = α + β(it) + t . (4)
Recall from the discussion above that (4) differs from
(3) in terms of encapsulating an exchange-rate risk. How-
ever, the null hypothesis that the interest-parity condition
as regards the London investment demand for bills of
exchange holds requires that β = 1.
Across the main financial centres on the European con-
tinent, columns (5) to (8) of Table 2 summarise the results
involving a combined investment in long-bills issued in
London with a sight-bill transaction on London upon
maturity. With estimates between 0.62 and 0.81, the slope
coefficients are much closer to the hypothesised value
than commonly found with modern data when future
exchange rate movements are left uncovered (see, e.g.
Engel 2014, p. 495). Still, the hypothesis that β = 1
is clearly rejected. This finding could reflect that before
1914, British banks were reluctant to invest in foreign cur-
rency bills. Unfortunately, the contemporaneous books
give only vague reasons why this was the case, e.g. by
merely mentioning that “foreign bills as an investment
are strangely neglected by English bankers” (Clare 1902,
p. 95). In any case, a key difference was that London
investments in continental bills, according to (4), were
subject to exchange-rate risk, whereas continental banks
could cover this by a suitable long-bill transaction (see (3)).
During the classical gold standard, aggravated levels
of political or economic uncertainty manifested them-
selves in large deviations of the sight-rate from the mint-
par (Clare 1902, p. 98). To uncover how the investment
demand for bills of exchange reacted to such events,
Table 3 splits the sample into observations within and
outside (or on) the gold points. Of note, the vagaries to
determine the gold points introduce an important caveat
to this approach. Still, for observations laying outside
the gold points according to the values reported in the
“Exchange rates during the gold standard” section, the top
panel suggests that the interest-parity condition as regards
the London investment demand for continental bills of
exchange can no longer be rejected for the case of Paris
(whereas there is only a rejection at the 10% level for
the case of Amsterdam)9. Although the London banker
was, reportedly, “content with a safe and steady rate of
interest” (Thomas 1921, p. 78), sufficiently large oppor-
tunities to make a chance profit did, perhaps, give rise
to more active short-term investment activity in higher
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yielding bills of exchange on established financial cen-
tres such as Paris. Conversely, according to the bottom
panel, the results of (3) differ hardly when distinguishing
between observations within and outside the gold points.
For the continental investment demand for London bills
of exchange, where exchange rate risk was hedged, this
distinction should indeed be less relevant.
Taken together, in how far the interest-parity condition
can be rejected for transactions between the major conti-
nental financial centres and London around 1900 seems to
depend on such things as the deviation from the mint-par.
In any case, it should not be overlooked that an interest-
parity puzzle, in terms of massive deviations from the
theoretically expected slope coefficient or even negative
values for β that have frequently been found with modern
data (see, e.g. Engel 2014, p. 495), does not arise in Tables 2
and 3. Perhaps thanks to the certainties associated with
sufficiently stable exchange rates, when properly specified
in terms of bills of exchange transactions, the interest-
parity condition held remarkably well between the core
currencies of the classical gold standard.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the interest-parity condi-
tion during the “belle epoque” of the gold standard
(1880–1914). The main innovation is to highlight the
role of bills of exchange as financial instruments to carry
out interest-parity transactions between sterling and four
European currencies (French and Belgian franc, Dutch
guilder, German mark) at the time. There are two main
take-home messages.
Firstly, as early as the end of the nineteenth century,
the premise that interest and exchange rates are closely
intertwined was prominently discussed in a number of
books about the foreign exchanges and money markets.
Above all, among practitioners, it seems to have been
widely known that European banks exploit international
differences in the short-term return between the major
gold-backed currencies. Yet, since international transac-
tions occurred mainly by means of bills of exchange, the
links between the exchange and interest rates in those days
are, perhaps, no longer obvious to the modern eye.
Secondly, for the most advanced European financial
centres around 1900, regressing the short-term interest
from discounting bills in the local money markets onto
the return implied in foreign bills of exchange yields coef-
ficients that come at least close to the interest-parity
condition. This lends support to the historical claim that
the so-called investment demand for bills of exchange
aligned the exchange rates of the major gold-backed cur-
rencies with the money market discount rates. Given that
massive deviations from the interest-parity condition (in
particular with the uncovered version) have commonly
been found with modern data, this is a remarkable result.
Endnotes
1 Rather than quantifying the numerous cost compo-
nents of transporting gold across borders, the band of
gold-arbitrage inactivity has also been estimated from
the nonlinear time series behaviour of the exchange rate
around the gold-points. For example, Canjels et al. (2004);
Juhl et al. (2006), and Bernholz and Kugler (2011) employ
a threshold autoregression model for this task.
2Cheques are a specific type of a bill in terms of being
a written order to a bank to pay a specified amount upon
presentation (Cassis 2010, p. 296).
3Given that New York began to emerge as an important
financial centre (Goodhart 1969; Cassis 2010, pp. 114ff.),
it is perhaps surprising that the United States are not
mentioned as important participant in the London dis-
count market. However, although the United States were
a major trading partner for Britain, the capital flows
were nowhere near those towards and from the principal
European countries. The transaction costs of shifting
financial capital across the Atlantic were still compara-
tively high. Hence, “the relative value of money, which
is so largely responsible for the movements of the chief
European exchanges, produces scarcely any perceptible
effect on the American rate” (Clare 1902, p. 130).
4During the second half of the 19th century, an early
forward market had developed in Vienna to deal with the
unstable behaviour of the Austrian-Hungarian currency,
which was effectively on a flexible exchange rate until the
1890s (Flandreau and Komlos 2006). It is therefore, per-
haps, not surprising that for the case of Austria-Hungary,
a verbal analysis of covered interest-arbitrage transactions
between Vienna and Berlin can be found as early as Lotz
(1889, pp. 1277ff.). Furthermore, around 1900, another
active forward exchange market existed for the Russian
rouble (see Yeager 1969).
5A Bartlett-kernel is used and there is no pre-whitening
of the residuals. Note that changing these options, or even
altering the bandwidth to values slightly different from 13,
did not overturn the essence of the results.
6 For all variables of Table 2, the conventional unit-root
tests (ADF, Phillips-Perron) suggest that even at the 1
per cent level of rejection, the time series are stationary
(for the sake of brevity, the corresponding results are not
reported here, but are available on request).
7 Concurring with this, for the case of Berlin, the
hypothesis that β = 1 can no longer be rejected when
restricting the sample to observations after 1900.
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8 In principle, the Vienna financial market would also
provide some data to test the interest parity via long-
bills of exchange transactions. However, the mone-
tary reforms mentioned back in the “Exchange rates
during the gold standard” section give rise to struc-
tural breaks in the exchange rate data. Furthermore,
Austria-Hungary only managed to gradually stabilise its
exchange rate to gold, and was neither officially on the
gold standard—banknotes remained inconvertible (see
Von Mises 1909)—nor considered to be an active par-
ticipant in the investment demand for bills of exchange
(see Clare 1902, p. 94). It is therefore not surprising that,
between London and Vienna, the interest-parity condi-
tion holds only when restricting the sample to some parts
of the early 20th century. For all these reasons, the case of
Austria-Hungary is not pursued further.
9With deviations between 0.2 and 0.7 per cent from
the mint-par, the bandwidth of gold-arbitrage inactivity
with the gold-points reported in the “Exchange rates dur-
ing the gold standard” section is similar to e.g. the 0.25
per cent reported for the sterling-to-guilder exchange rate
around 1900 in Kugler (2016). The value of the gold-
points can also be inferred from the nonlinear behaviour
of the sight-rate s∗t (see footnote 1). Employing the thresh-
old autoregression model of Canjels et al. (2004, p. 876)
yields indeed slightly different gold-points of 25.10 Fcs/£
and 25.34 Fcs/£ for the French franc, 25.15 Fcs/£ and
25.29 Fcs/£ for the Belgian franc, 12.03 Fl/£ and 12.11 Fl/£
for the Dutch guilder, and 20.34 M/£ and 20.52 M./£ for
the German mark. However, using these values did not
change the essence of the results reported in Table 3.
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